Performance of Nordic public family firms : comparable analysis of Nordic public family firm’s performance against the Fama and french five-factor model by Ulland, Arne Magnus Lorentzen & Upsaker, Thomas
 
 
Performance of Nordic Public 
Family Firms 
A comparable analysis of Nordic public family firm’s 
performance against the Fama and French five-factor model 
 
Arne Magnus Lorentzen Ulland & Thomas Upsaker 
Supervisor: Karin S. Thorburn 
Master Thesis, MSc in Economics and Business Administration,  
Financial Economics 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are 
responsible − through the approval of this thesis − for the theories and methods used, or results 
and conclusions drawn in this work. 
Norwegian School of Economics  




This thesis examines the stock market performance of family firms in the Nordic region. 
Specifically, we investigate whether an investor would have earned higher returns by investing 
in Nordic family firms than being passively invested in the five factors of Fama and French 
during the last 20 years. Furthermore, we attempt to find if there are any differences with respect 
to abnormal return between the four included countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden.  
We have defined a family firm as a firm where the founder, or individuals related to the founder 
either by blood or marriage, has at least 20% ownership. Active participation by the family is 
not necessary, but rather a right. We create a portfolio of 291 family firms, in total, and use the 
Fama and French five-factor model to see if the family firm portfolio has achieved an abnormal 
return during the period January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2019.  
We find that our value-weighted Nordic family firm portfolio generates an average monthly 
abnormal return of 2.19%, and the result is significant at a 0.1% level. This suggests that during 
the last 20 years an investor would have been better off investing in Nordic family firms 
compared to being passively invested in the five factors of Fama and French. This finding is 
robust to Nordic market performance and stricter definitions of family firms. Moreover, family 
firms in Denmark show the highest abnormal performance, and there is one large danish firm 
that greatly impacts our results.  
Despite our positive findings for family firm performance, our results are ex-post and thus only 
show historical performance and is consequently not an indicator for future performance for 
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This section provides a brief introduction to our motivation for this thesis (1.1), our aim of the 
thesis (1.2), and next, the outline of this thesis (1.3).  
1.1 Motivational background for the thesis 
The topic of family firms has historically not been the most popular subject in the field of 
academia, but researchers have in the last couple of decades intensified the investigation on the 
topic. Seeing family firms in Europe being the most dominant type of firm, accounting for half 
of the employment and contributing to a large share of GDP (Mandl, 2008), it is about time that 
the focus tilts towards the engine of the economy, the family firm. This makes research on 
family firms important as it can give extensive information to policymakers deciding on new 
policies. Moreover, as family firms tend to be more profitable than non-family firms (Berzins 
& Bøhren, 2013), it might give direction to entrepreneurs, business leaders, and investors. 
Most studies conducted on family firms focus on the area of performance, whether they provide 
better performance than non-family firms or not (Amit & Villalonga, 2006; Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Lee, 2006; Maury, 2006). Even though 
many scholars find that family firms perform better than non-family firms, there is no consensus 
among the society of academic scholars, as some studies also suggest this kind of firms 
underperform compared to non-family firms (Carney, 2005; Pérez-González, 2006; Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). This makes the subject of family firms interesting because 
of the various conclusions across the research field. Moreover, only a small part of family firm 
studies focuses on firms in Europe, as public firms listed in the U.S. are the most common 
foundation for research. As such, other geographical regions are often neglected, especially the 
Nordic region, and there is little empirical research as to whether public family firms 
outperform or not.  
Furthermore, another motivational aspect of this thesis is the lack of studies investigating family 
firms’ mispricing and the creation of abnormal returns. Studies aforementioned are based on 
operational measures (ROA) or market valuation (Tobin´s q), while few seek to emphasize the 
investor’s perspective concerning family firms. Admittedly, there are some studies on this topic 
in Europe, such as Cella (2009) and Corstjens et al. (2006) giving ambivalent conclusions 
whether public family firms create abnormal returns, but none having a focus on the Nordic 
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region. Considering that managers and owners on average care about whether their stock is 
mispriced or not, we believe this branch of the family firm research field is important. We will 
test for abnormal return by using the Fama and French five-factor model as a benchmark to our 
family firm portfolio. This model captures all systematic risk priced by the market, but do not 
capture idiosyncratic risk. As we seek to identify a firm-specific characteristic concerning 
family firm performance, the model is applicable. 
1.2 Aim of the thesis 
The goal of this master thesis is to extend the research on public family firms in the Nordic 
region. Particularly, we seek to find if family firms in the Nordic region have been mispriced 
in the time period of 2000-2019 and thereby created an abnormal return. Furthermore, we 
attempt to find if there are any differences concerning the abnormal return between the four 
included countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Indeed, we find a positive 
monthly abnormal return for a value-weighted portfolio of family firms of 2.19%, where the 
Danish family firms account for most of the abnormal return.  
1.3 Thesis outline 
This thesis is split into six parts and proceed as follows. In the first part (Section 2), we introduce 
the theoretical framework needed to understand the rich literature involving the various 
definitions for family firms. Moreover, we describe the Efficient Market Hypothesis which is 
central to discussing mispricing, and present the difference between systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk. Section 3 consists of an extensive review of the relevant literature regarding 
family firms and performance, and its purpose is to give the reader an introduction to the topic 
and a foundation for further discussion. Following this section, Section 4 explains how we 
gathered our data and created our portfolio of family firms. Section 5 explains the theoretical 
framework of the Fama and French five-factor model and presents the methodological approach 
used in this thesis. Section 6 shows and discusses the findings from the data analysis and section 
7 elaborates on the limitations of this thesis. Lastly, we present our conclusion and suggestions 
for further research.   
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Family firms 
To reach a broadly accepted definition of a family firm is a tedious process that is yet to be 
agreed upon. To illustrate, currently, more than 90 family firm definitions exist and are being 
applied throughout academia (European Commission, 2009). Consequently, it is difficult to 
establish significant results that are conclusive in terms of family firm performance while being 
independent of how a family firm initially was defined. We will thus in this section describe 
some of the various definitions, and why we think that an applicable definition of a family firm 
is a firm where the founder, or individuals related to the founder either by blood or marriage, 
has at least 20% ownership.   
2.1.1 Various definitions 
The issue of defining a family firm starts already when debating whether the founder must be 
a CEO or if it is enough that a relative to the founder is CEO (McConaughy, Matthews, & 
Fialko, 2001). Other definitions, such as La Porta et al. (1999) try to incorporate how much the 
founder can control the firm by defining a set percentage of ownership (in this case 20%). A 
higher percentage of ownership increases the founder’s ability to influence decision-making 
and corporate governance. Anderson and Reeb (2003) address this problem as their results show 
that firm performance is nonmonotonic, meaning that performance increases as family 
ownership rises but then decreases as ownership exceeds an optimal level at 32%. Berzins, 
Bøhren, and Stacescu (2018) define meaningful ownership as that a group of owners should 
hold more than half of the voting rights, but these definitions apply to private and not public 
firms. If implied, the data sample for most public family firm research would be too small to 
find any meaningful results. On the other hand, a small ownership threshold such as 10% 
(Maury, 2006) seems too small as that classifies too many as family firms and the family effect 
would be neglectable and non-conclusive.  
To address the social dimension in a family firm, Arosa et al. (2010) define a family firm as 
where there is a founder or family owner who participates actively in monitoring the firm. At 
first glance, this definition seems logical and applicable. However, Berzins, Bøhren, and 
Stacescu (2018) explain that it is the opposite. With Arosa et al.’s (2010) definition of a family 
firm, a family or founder that holds neither a board seat nor the CEO position yet owns the firm, 
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will not be classified as a family firm. Conversely, a family that holds a board seat, but does 
not own the firm, will be classified as a family firm. We thus tend to favor Berzins, Bøhren, 
and Stacescu’s (2018) definition which focuses on the right to participate in corporate 
governance, not the actual participation. Hence, what matters is a high level of ownership which 
produces the right to govern.  
 10
Table 1: Shows the various definitions being used in literature. 
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2.1.2 Our definition 
By combining Anderson and Reeb (2003), La Porta et al. (1999) and Berzins, Bøhren, and 
Stacescu (2018), we define a family firm as a firm where the founder, or individuals related to 
the founder either by blood or marriage, has at least 20% ownership. Active participation by 
the family is not necessary, but rather a right. 
2.2 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
As explained in section 1.3, our aim of the thesis is to analyze potential stock mispricing among 
family firms, and thereby the possibility of creating abnormal returns, in the Nordic region in 
the time period of 2000-2019. Hence, we will in this section describe the efficient market 
hypothesis and how mispricing might occur.  
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that the capital market is said to be efficient if 
it fully reflects all relevant information in determining security prices (Fama, 1970). Efficiency 
in these terms means that it “does not allow investors to earn an above-average return without 
accepting above-average risks” (Malkiel B. G., 2003, p. 62). More specifically: 
The market is said to be efficient with respect to some information set, ¢, if security 
prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all participants. Moreover, 
efficiency with respect to an information set, ¢, implies that it is impossible to make 
economic profits by trading on the basis of ¢  (Malkiel B. G., 1989, p. 127).  
In 1967, Harry Roberts (1967) formulated the distinction between weak and strong market 
efficiency which is still the taxonomy used today. The weak form of the EMH states that current 
stock prices only reflect historical price information. This means that using investment methods 
such as technical analysis where one base the strategy on past patterns should not yield 
abnormal return. The semi-strong form of the EMH states that the current stock price reflects 
historical price information as well as publicly available company information. This means that 
an investor should not be able to achieve an abnormal return by analyzing financial statements 
and other public information that is relevant to the stock. The strong form of the EMH states 
that the current stock price reflects all information, specifically historical prices, public 
information, and insider information. This means that not even insiders in the firm should be 
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able to achieve an abnormal return despite being closest to the information source, and there is 
a perfect revelation of all private information in market prices (Malkiel B. G., 1989).  
2.3 Systematic versus Idiosyncratic risk 
As systematic- and idiosyncratic risk is an important part of the Fama and French factor models 
and a part of our methodology section, we want to explain the difference between the two 
concepts. The Dodd-Frank Act and the Financial Stability Oversight Council describe 
systematic risk as risk related to the financial system or market as a whole, as opposed to the 
risk facing individual financial institutions or market participants (Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, 2012). This implies that systematic risk is not diversifiable and it affects the entire 
market. On the other hand, idiosyncratic risk is “defined as the risk that is unique to a specific 
firm, … also called firm-specific risk…. (and) is independent of the common movement of the 
market” (Fu, 2009, p. 26). 
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3. Literature Review 
In the following section, we will examine the existing literature on family firm performance 
and draw a picture of the various understandings of different scholars on family firms.  
Governance research is a common and well-investigated research field. Countless studies are 
trying to find a relationship between how a firm is governed and its performance. A small 
branch of this research field is the topic of family firm performance. Relatively, this subject has 
been neglected as a heavily investigated topic despite it being the most common form of 
corporate ownership (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). This may be due to the 
difficulty in obtaining reliable data on these firms (Amit & Villalonga, 2006). 
Most studies on the relationship between family ownership and firm performance have been 
conducted in the U.S. Anderson and Reeb (2003) studies the performance of family firms in the 
S&P 500 and find a positive relationship between public family firms and firm performance. 
Further evidence of family firm performance is presented by Lee (2006), who also studies firms 
in the S&P 500, arguing that family firms exceed non-family firms in relation to revenue growth 
and profitability. Amit and Villalonga (2006) show that family ownership creates value in 
excess of non-family firms, but their study only finds significant results when the founder serves 
as a CEO or as Chairman. In other words, passive family ownership does not lead to family 
firms outperforming firms with dispersed ownership. Furthermore, evidence from Amit and 
Villalonga (2006) suggests that descendants serving as CEOs destroy firm value, meaning the 
firm is better off hiring an outside CEO when the founder resigns.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003) have also another interesting finding in their study of family firms. 
They find that the relationship between the level of ownership and the performance of family 
firms has an inverted U-shape curve. The non-linear relationship has an optimal ownership 
concentration of 32 percent which suggests that firm performance decreases with ownership 
levels exceeding this turning point. This result may explain a weakness in studies of family 
firms. The definition of a family firm and choice of ownership threshold may have a substantial 
impact on a study’s final conclusion of family firm performance and may explain the various 
conclusions of academic scholars. Research by Miller, Breton-Miller, Lester, and Canella 
(2007) supports these findings by suggesting that only public family firms in the U.S. with a 
lone founder outperform non-family firms. Moreover, they conclude that the outperformance 
of family businesses was a result of how these businesses were defined. It is important to stress 
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the fact that findings are highly sensitive to the definition of family firms and to the nature of 
the sample. 
Even though there are American studies that show family firm outperformance, the general 
portrayal of family firms is inconclusive as to whether family ownership leads to better 
performance or not. Often these kinds of firms suffer from nepotism, inter-generational 
problems, and too much altruism, which all may hold back a firm’s performance (Pérez-
González, 2006; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Altruism is a problem because 
the firm may stick with a family-manager since the manager is family and not because the 
manager contributes something special. This is an agency cost problem that may deter 
performance in family firms. This quote of a senior family manager in the study by Rosenblatt 
et al. perfectly exemplifies the problem with altruism: “If my sons or my wife make mistakes, 
I let it go, because it’s not worth fighting over. You have to live with your family. A non-family 
member, you can fire him.” (1985, p. 112). Carney (2005) argues that these characteristics are 
constraining the family businesses from experiencing growth and longevity, and thereby 
causing a negative relationship between family ownership and firm performance.  
On the other hand, by looking at how employee assessments predict performance, Huang, Li, 
Meschke, and Guthrie (2015) find that family firms exhibit a human-capital enhancing culture 
that improves firm performance. They see that, in firms where the founder takes an active role 
in the business, employees are more satisfied with their employer than in non-family firms. 
Interestingly, they also find that this culture reverses when the firm is controlled by a 
descendant. McConaughy et al. (1998) further argue that because of the alignment of owner-
manager goals and incentives, family-owner monitoring of family managers encourages high 
performance and reduces shareholder and manager conflicts. Lower agency costs are enhancing 
the performance of family firms.  
The majority of family firm studies use roughly the same methods to investigate the 
performance. The accounting-based performance indicators Tobin’s q (which is the market 
value of total assets divided by the replacement costs of assets) and return on assets (ROA) are 
used by several academic scholars, such as Anderson and Reeb (2003), Amit and Villalonga 
(2006) and Miller et al. (2007). Evaluating performance based on accounting measures is found 
to face a limitation due to “not fully recognize the family firm factors in the book value of the 
firm or the implications for long-run persistence of earnings” (Duncan & Hasso, 2013). The 
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authors argue that performance studies based on accounting information do not fully reflect the 
intrinsic value of family firms.   
A less common approach uses the stock performance of family firms to evaluate whether they 
outperform or not. Cella (2009) finds that family firms in Europe generate higher returns 
compared to non-family firms. The study concludes that the differences in the performance 
between the two are not perfectly captured by the Fama and French two-factor model. She finds 
that family firm stocks trade at a discount and further argues that agency costs between family 
owners and minority shareholders affect the price and required return on family stocks. The 
evidence of Morck et al. and Ali et al. (2003; 2007) find that family ownership tends to have 
less internal corporate governance. This makes minority shareholders more exposed to 
expropriation by the controlling block holders, and therefore want to be compensated for that 
extra risk. A second study on family firm stock returns by Corstjens, Peyer, and Heyden (2006) 
suggest that family firms in France, Germany, UK, and the US do not perform better or worse 
than non-family firms in terms of stock returns, except for French family firms who perform 
better than non-family firms. The stock returns are well explained by the four-factor Fama-
French-Cahart valuation model.  
This leads us to our main aim of this thesis. Based on a data sample of family firms in the 
Nordic region, we want to investigate if investing in a portfolio of Nordic family firms would 
make an investor better off than passively investing in the factors of the Fama and French. 
Further, we want to investigate whether there are differences between the countries in the 
Nordic region with respect to performance. 
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4. Data 
To analyze public Nordic family firms, we gather data from several databases. In the 
subsections below, we will explain how the data is gathered, filtered, and matched (4.1), and 
how we created our different portfolios (4.2). Lastly, we take a look at the statistics of our main 
variables (4.3). 
4.1 Sample selection 
4.1.1 Data sample 
Our data is primarily extracted from two separate databases. To find firm ownership, which is 
essential as we aim to create a database with firms run by founders or descendants with more 
than 20% ownership, we use Bureau van Dijk (BvD). BvD is a specialist provider of public and 
private company information. We specifically use the database Amadeus to extract information 
regarding Nordic public company names, shareholder names, and their ownership within the 
firm. This process is done incrementally for each Nordic country. Then, after finding the 
companies with at least one shareholder owning more than 20% which was more than 900 
firms, we solve a difficult question: “How can we find out if the information displays a founder 
or a descendant of the founder?”. To solve this, we manually check the investor relation page 
and selectively read financial reports for each firm and check if the largest owner is either the 
founder or a descendant of the founder. This tedious task also has room for error as our main 
source is the firm's web page which could include mistakes and errors. Moreover, this is 
especially an issue for smaller firms that operates without a professional webpage or detailed 
corporate information in their reports. Firms with too much historical uncertainty are neglected 
from the sample. 
Another issue is if there is more than one stockholder with ownership exceeding 20%. In these 
cases, we decide to only include firms in the sample where the largest owner is a founder or 
related to the founder by blood or marriage. We argue that we cannot explicitly say that any 
firm performance is due to the firm being family-driven if there is a large non-family owner 
who could potentially have the most influence over the firm’s performance. We thus find it 
more reasonable to exclude such instances and rather only work with occurrences where the 
largest owner is a founder or a descendant. 
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4.1.2 Selection criteria 
Selection criteria 1: Time period 
Which time-period one chooses can greatly affect the results of performance. As an example, 
the yearly compounded average return from the S&P500 including dividends and splits from 
1928 to 2019 was 9 % while it was 12 % from 1941 to 2019 (Damodaran, 2019). We argue that 
a long time period is better than a short one as the sensitivity to macroeconomic shocks and 
events gets less magnitude when the time period is substantial. We thus opt for the longest 
downloadable period from BvD, which is 2000 to 2019. 
Selection criteria 2: Countries 
As mentioned previously, there is little research on family firms in the Nordic region, and 
especially little research looking at the Nordic region as a whole. The Nordic region includes 
the countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. However, there are no firms 
from Iceland in our data sample. This is due to the fact that there are no firms meeting our 
criteria for being a family firm during our time period. Hence, the term “Nordic region” in this 
thesis refers to the four countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 
Selection criteria 3: National ownership 
Firms traded on one of the Nordic exchanges but not registered as a company in any of the 
Nordic countries, such as the “Norwegian companies” Golden Ocean and Frontline, are 
excluded from the data sample as they are not Nordic firms per definition. Neglecting these 
kinds of firms is also necessary due to a lack of historical- and ownership information on such 
companies. Furthermore, firms where the government is the founder and largest owner are 
excluded from our sample as governments cannot be defined as a family as per our definition 
in section 2.1.2. 
Selection criteria 4: Ownership  
We define a family firm as a firm where the founder, or individuals related to the founder either 
by blood or marriage, has at least 20% ownership. Active participation by the family is not 
necessary, but rather a right. We look at the percentage of voting rights a family has and not the 
percentage of cash flow rights. This means that firms where families have above 20% of voting 
rights but less than 20% of cash flow rights are still included in the portfolio. Our base year for 
 18
family ownership is 2019, meaning that firms that today are still owned by their founder family 
are included in our portfolio. Lastly, firms that are family founded, but the family is no longer 
a substantial owner with at least 20% of the shares, are not included in the sample. 
Once the ownership filtering is done, we end up with a family firm database for each country 
where each family firm is run by a founder or a descendant of the founder where they own 20% 
or more of the firm. In total, we have a data sample of 291 firms. 
4.1.3 Stock prices and market capitalization 
We use Datastream from Thomson Reuters to find monthly adjusted stock prices (adjusted for 
splits and dividends) and market capitalization (𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑥 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
which is needed to create a portfolio with monthly performance. We also gather currency 
information and transform all prices in Danish kroner (DKK), Norwegian kroner (NOK), and 
Swedish kroner (SEK) to a common currency, namely euros (EUR). This is done because we 
need market capitalization in the same currency across all countries to create a family firm 
portfolio where we can analyze performance. Consequently, for these three countries, the 
fluctuations in market capitalization and prices will be affected by movements in the exchange 
rates.  
4.2 Portfolio construction 
4.2.1 Value-weighted portfolio 
A value-weighted portfolio or a capitalizing-weighted portfolio is a portfolio where the included 
securities get a weight based on their market capitalization. First, one finds the weight per 
security by taking the market capitalization for that security and dividing it by the total market 
capitalization of the portfolio. In a value-weighted portfolio, the stocks with the largest market 




𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
 
Once we find each firm’s weighting in the portfolio based on market capitalization, we sum the 
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market capitalization for each month and multiply that weight with the firm’s stock price to 
find the weighted stock price.  
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖  ×  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 
We then sum the weighted stock price for all securities per month which enables us to establish 
a weighted price per month that can be interpreted as an index price. Note that this index price 
is rebalanced per month as market capitalization changes. Finally, we repeat this process per 
month and calculate the weighted monthly return (WMR) for the value-weighted portfolio as 
such: 
𝑊𝑀𝑅𝑖 =
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 – 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 
  
By gathering the market capitalization for Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as described 
in section 4.1.3 and then proceed with the procedure from section 4.2.1, we construct the Nordic 
value-weighted portfolio. To construct the value-weighted portfolio for Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, and Norway, we follow the same procedure but only using stocks in the respective 
country.  
4.2.2 Equal-weighted portfolio 
An equal-weighted portfolio is a portfolio where each firm’s monthly return gets equal weight 
in the portfolio, regardless of its market capitalization. The formula for constructing the weight 
looks like this: 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖 =
1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
First, the equal-weighted portfolio is constructed by finding the monthly return for each firm 
by using its monthly adjusted prices. Secondly, each firm gets a weight equal to one divided by 
the number of firms in the portfolio. Lastly, the monthly return (EMR) of the equal-weighted 
portfolio is found by multiplying the firms’ monthly returns with their weight. Thereafter, we 
add together each firm’s weighted return to find the portfolio’s monthly return. The portfolio is 
rebalanced every month as new family firms get publicly listed and added to the portfolio. The 
formula looks like this: 
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As we did for the value-weighted portfolio, we also construct a Nordic equal-weighted portfolio 
as well as a portfolio for Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the main variables for our sample of family firms. The 
table reports the mean, median, minimum, and maximum value, and the standard error for all 
variables. To illustrate, when referring to the mean of a portfolio, e.g., the Swedish value-
weighted portfolio, the mean, in this case, shows the monthly average return in that portfolio 
and this mean-performance can be compared across portfolios.  
Further, at the lowest, there are 83 family firms in the sample and a maximum of 291 family 
firms in the sample. The number of firms increases as more firms get added to the portfolio 
each year. We note that the Nordic value-weighted return is more extreme in both directions, 
returning -29% against -15% for the equal-weighted portfolio. The worst return for the value-
weighted portfolio is also far worse than for the market, 19% respectively. The opposite applies 
for the upside, and we note too that the standard deviation is above the market’s standard 
deviation. This shows that the value-weighted portfolio, while showing stronger mean and 
median performance, is far more volatile than the market.  
The market capitalization of family firms in the portfolio varies tremendously across firms. The 
smallest firm within the period has 40,000 euro in market capitalization while the largest one 
(Novo Nordisk) has 113 billion euro in market capitalization. We note though that while the 
mean firm has 1.28 billion euro, the median firm within the sample is a small firm, with only 
78 million euros in market capitalization. As such, we are mostly dealing with small firms and 
a few larger firms within the sample. 
We note that the Nordic value-weighted portfolio has a higher upside and downside with respect 
to both performance and standard deviation than both the equal-weighted portfolio and the 
market portfolio. The equal-weighted portfolio, on the other hand, has a lower downside, but a 
larger upside than the market portfolio, but has a larger standard deviation. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of main variables 
1) Number of family firms within the sample. 2) Number of market capitalization observations within the data sample. Each firm will have a 
maximum of 240 (number of months) observations. Market capitalization is affected by changes in price and number of stocks per month and 
thus changes from month to month. 3) Number of months in the data sample as the time-period is 01.2000 to 12.2019.  
From Table 2 and Table 3 we note that our data, which consists of 291 family firms, is highly 
skewed towards Sweden which has 191 family firms while Denmark has 13%, Finland 11%, 
and Norway 11% of the total family firm sample. Looking at the market capitalization in Table 
3, we note that the mean family firm is largest in Denmark (skewed due to the global diabetes 
firm Novo Nordisk) while the mean firm is smallest in Norway. On the other hand, we note that 
the median firm in Denmark is the smallest and the median firm is the largest in Norway, 
meaning that the family firms in Norway are generally larger than in the other Nordic countries. 
Furthermore, looking at the value-weighted portfolio returns in Table 3, Denmark and Norway 
have more extreme monthly returns in both directions than Finland and Sweden, which could 
imply that the two former countries’ value-weighted portfolios move more than the two latter 
countries. This is confirmed by the standard deviations of Denmark and Norway, showing the 
highest values. Even though these two value-weighted portfolios have more extreme values in 
both directions, there are signs that the monthly returns are more extreme on the upside. This is 
suggested by the fact that the mean return is higher than the median return. In the case of 
Finland’s and Sweden’s value-weighted portfolios, these portfolios suffer from the opposite 
relationship between mean and median return, which suggests that there is more magnitude to 
the negative returns than the positive returns. 
Overall, looking at the mean returns of the four countries, Denmark’s value-weighted portfolio 
performs on average the best, with Finland closely behind. Finland, having a monthly average 
return of 1.92% compared to Denmark’s 1.97% while experiencing substantially lower 
volatility, may show the best risk-reward ratio of the four portfolios. On the contrary, Norway’s 
value-weighted portfolio, having the far lowest monthly average return and the second-highest 
standard deviation, stands out with the worst risk-reward ratio. 
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The equal-weighted portfolios show a somewhat different picture of the four countries’ 
performances. In this context, Norway and Sweden have the highest monthly average return, 
respectively, while Finland’s portfolio performing the worst. On the contrary to the value-
weighted portfolios, the equal-weighted portfolios move lesser in both directions, which is also 
verifiable by the lower standard deviations.  
Table 3: Summary statistics of main variables from the country-specific portfolios 
1) Number of family firms within the sample. 2) Number of market capitalization observations within the data sample. Each firm will have a 
maximum of 240 (number of months) observations. Market capitalization is affected by changes in price and number of stocks per month 
and thus changes from month to month. 3) Number of months in the data sample as the time period is from 01.01.2000 to 01.01.2020.   
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5. Methodology 
In this section, we present the theoretical background of the methodology used in the thesis. 
Section 5.2.1 goes further into the Fama and French three-factor model, and section 5.2.2 
presents the Fama and French five-factor model. Section 5.2.3 explains our motivation for using 
the Fama and French five-factor model, while section 5.2.4 presents how we apply the model.  
5.1 Performance measurement 
Tobin’s q and return on assets (ROA), as described in section 3, are commonly used as 
performance measurements, but since the scope of this thesis is family firms’ stock 
performance, our dependent variable or performance measurement is family firm stock return, 
in excess of the risk-free rate. This dependent variable allows us to use the Fama and French 
five-factor model to analyze whether our family firm portfolio creates an abnormal return, 
which is the return an investor could have achieved in excess of being passively invested in the 
five factors.  
5.2 Fama and French 
A widely used asset-pricing model is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) – a model well 
known for being able to estimate the cost of capital of firms and evaluate the performance of 
managed portfolios. The idea behind CAPM is that the return for an asset is a linear function of 
its systematic risk. This implies that the market only prices systematic risk and not idiosyncratic 
risk. However, despite the model’s well-known reputation and being a mandatory curriculum 
in most MBA programs, its critics are many, often seeing the model failing to explain the cross-
section of average returns on common stocks (Fama & French, 1993; 2004). Trying to improve 
this model, Fama and French (1993) developed a three-factor model that builds upon the 
CAPM. Later they introduced the five-factor model which enhanced the first three-factor 
model. We will in this section explain the models and why we use the Fama and French five-
factor model in this thesis. 
5.2.1 Fama and French three-factor model 
Introduced in 1993, Fama and French (1993) added the two explanatory variables size (SMB) 
and book-to-market (HML) to the time series regression approach of Black, Jensen, and Scholes 
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(1972). Essentially, the work of Fama and French was to explain the average stock returns by 
controlling for the relation between size and average return, and the relation between average 
return and book-to-market.  
The first factor in the model, an overall market factor (Mkt_RF), is the return on the value-
weighted market portfolio in excess of a one-month U.S. T-bill.  
To construct the two factors, SMB and HML, Fama and French form six portfolios based on 
market capitalization and book-to-market. First, they split the stocks into small (S) and big (B) 
based on whether stocks are below or above the median firm’s market capitalization. Second, 
they rank the firms on book-to-market ratio and break the stocks into three book-to-market 
groups. The lowest 30% in one group (L), the middle 40% in another group (M), and the third 
group consisting of the 30% highest book-to-market firms (H). Lastly, they form six portfolios 
by grouping the small and the big stocks with the three classifications of book-to-market ratio 
(S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M, and B/H) (Fama & French, 1993). 
The SMB factor is constructed by taking “the difference between the average returns on the 
three small-stock portfolios (S/L, S/M, and S/H) and the average return on the big-stock 
portfolios (B/L, B/M, and B/H)” (Fama & French, 1993, p. 9). Hence, the SMB factor should 
exclude any effect from the book-to-market ratio. The SMB factor represents the difference 
between the returns on a diversified portfolio of small stocks and a diversified portfolio of big 
stocks. 
The HML factor is constructed by taking “the difference between the average on the two high-
book-to-market portfolios (S/H and B/H) and the average of the returns on the two low-book-
to-market portfolios (S/L and B/L)” (Fama & French, 1993, p. 9). As such, the HML factor 
should exclude the size effect in returns. The HML factor represents the difference between a 
diversified portfolio of stocks with a high book-to-market ratio and a diversified portfolio of 
stocks with a low-book-to-market ratio (Fama & French, 2015). 
In their paper from 1993, Fama and French (1993) argue that the two latter (SMB and HML) 
factors are proxies for common risk factors or more-fundamental variables. In other words, they 
may capture sensitivity to macroeconomic risk which the beta in CAPM does not. The main 
rationale behind the SMB and HML factors are that, in the long run, small companies 
overperform large companies and value stocks tend to see higher returns than growth stocks 
(Fama & French, 1993). 
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5.2.2 Fama and French five-factor model 
For many years, the three-factor model was seen as a powerful model to explain the variation 
in returns of stocks and portfolios. However, evidence later suggested the model to be 
incomplete. The model lacked the ability to capture the variation in average returns related to 
how profitable firms are and firms’ investment activity (Fama & French, 2015). To capture 
these relationships, Fama and French (2015) extended the three-factor model to a five-factor 
model with the two factors RMW and CMA.  
When introducing the RMW and CMA factors, Fama and French (2015) had to control for these 
two factors when constructing the SMB factor, and therefore changed the way the SMB factor 
was constructed. In the five-factor model, they split the SMB factor into SMBB/M, SMBOP, and 
SMBInv. The three new size factors control for book-to-market, profitability, and investment, 
respectively. Similar to the HML factor, the RMW and CMA factors are split into three groups 
each: low (W and C), medium (MRMW and MCMA), and high (R and A) with the same percentiles. 
Then, they form twelve new portfolios combining size with profitability and size with 
investments. Each of the three SMB factors is constructed by taking the difference between the 
average returns on the three small portfolios (e.g. S/W, S/MRMW, S/R) and the average return 
on the three large portfolios (e.g. B/W, B/MRMW, B/R). Lastly, the overall SMB factor is the 
average of the returns on the three SMB factors: SMBB/M, SMBOP, and SMBInv (Fama & French, 
2015). 
To construct the RMW factor, Fama and French (2015) define the firms below the 30th 
percentile as firms with weak profitability and firms above the 70th percentile as firms with 
robust profitability. Profitability is defined as “revenues minus cost of goods sold, minus 
selling, general and administrative expenses, minus interest expense all divided by book equity” 
(Fama & French, 2015, p. 3). Then, the RMW factor is constructed by taking the difference 
between the average on the two robust portfolios (S/R and B/R) and the average of the returns 
on the two weak portfolios (S/W and B/W). As such, the RMW factor should exclude the size 
effect in returns. The RMW factor represents the difference between the returns on a diversified 
portfolio of stocks with robust profitability to a diversified portfolio including stocks with weak 
profitability (Fama & French, 2015). 
The construction of the CMA factor follows a similar procedure. Fama and French (2015) 
define the firms below the 30th percentile as conservative firms with respect to investment and 
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firms above the 70th percentile as aggressive firms. The grouping of investment is based on the 
change in assets from one year to another. The CMA factor is then found by taking the 
difference between the returns on two diversified portfolios of conservative (S/C and B/C) and 
aggressive firms (S/A and B/A). As such, the CMA factor should exclude the size effect in 
returns. The CMA factor represents the difference between the returns on a diversified portfolio 
of conservative stocks to a diversified portfolio of aggressive firms, here with respect to 
investment activity (Fama & French, 2015). 
These two additional factors give us a model that outperforms the three-factor model in 
explaining the variation in returns of stocks (Fama & French, 2015). Seen below, is the equation 
representing the five-factor model: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) +  𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
The alpha is the intercept and the coefficients bi, si, hi, ri, and ci are the respective factor exposure 
or betas to the five risk factors. In other words, they can be interpreted as a measure of the 
sensitivity of a portfolio or asset to the factors. Furthermore, they represent how to mimic the 
return achieved in a portfolio.  
Descriptive statistics for the five factors of Fama and French 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the five-factor Fama French model. When looking 
at the mean performance, we note that the HML, RMW, and CMA portfolios, on average, 
perform approximately the same. The HML portfolio has the highest standard deviation among 
the three, while the RMW portfolio is the least volatile. The SMB portfolio performs, on 
average, the worst as the mean performance is the lowest among the five factors. Lastly, the 
market minus risk-free portfolio has the highest mean performance but also the highest standard 
deviation. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the five-factors 
 
3) Number of months in the data sample as the time-period is 01.2000 to 12.2019. 
5.2.3 Motivation for using the Fama and French five-factor model 
As introduced in section 5.2, CAPM explains that the market only prices systematic risk and 
not idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, the model explains an asset’s sensitivity to market risk, but 
do not differentiate between the various systematic risk factors coherent in the market. To solve 
this, Fama and French attempt to capture these specific systematic risk factors by first 
introducing size-risk and value-risk, and later adding profitability and investment as risk factors. 
With the five-factor model, it is assumed that the model captures the expected return explained 
by all five systematic risk factors. Any alpha, as measured by the intercept, is thus attributable 
to idiosyncratic risk which is not explained by the model. This depends on the assumption that 
the five-factor model does indeed capture all possible systematic risk and performance above 
and beyond that priced by the market. Consequently, any significant alpha could be interpreted 
as firm-specific risk. Lastly, this allows us to isolate the family effect on firms’ performance, 
and therefore the five-factor model is appropriate for this thesis. 
5.2.4 Application of the Fama and French five-factor model 
The five factors are retrieved from the website of Ken French. By using the Fama and French 
five-factor model on our value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios described in section 
4.1.1, we seek to explain the returns of our family firm portfolios. Particularly, we are interested 
in the intercept, as a statistically significant result here suggests an abnormal return for family 
firms. Moreover, this suggests that an investor could have earned excess return by investing in 
family firms instead of passively investing in the five factors.  
Moreover, we choose to use the Fama and French factors of the developed world, including 
companies from 23 different countries around the globe, such as Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, USA, Japan, Australia, and more. The reason for choosing factors from the developed 
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markets are two folded. First, the factors should represent the investing option an investor has 
when deciding to invest in the world market. As there are no factors representing the entire 
world market on the Ken French website, the developed market factors are those factors that 
most closely represent the world market. Second, the factors considering the developed market 
include the countries in the Nordic region, which is important as this is the region of concern.  
We further argue that factors from the developed markets are reasonable to use to represent the 
investment opportunities for an investor having the world as a market. This is because world 
indexes, such as the MSCI World Index, also base their world index on companies across the 
same 23 developed markets as our factors are based on.   
To answer our research question concerning the stock market performance of family firms, we 
use a time-series analysis. We perform a joint test of abnormal performance and test if the five-
factor model captures all systematic risks that are priced by the market. The five-factor model 
is estimated by linear regression. 
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6. Empirical Results and Analysis 
We will in this section present our findings and analyze the results. Section 6.1 looks at the 
performance of the Nordic equal-weighted portfolio. In section 6.2 we examine the results of 
our regression on the Nordic value-weighted portfolio. In section 6.3 we analyze the country- 
and year-specific results with respect to performance. In section 6.4 we perform a robustness 
test. 
6.1 Performance of the Nordic equally-weighted portfolio 
Following the method described in 5.2.4, Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates for the 
Nordic equal-weighted portfolio (1). We note that the intercept is positive, meaning that there 
is a positive abnormal return for family firms in excess of the five factors, and the monthly 
alpha is 1.04%. This result is statistically significant at a 0.1% level. Moreover, we note that 
the portfolio is positively correlated with the market. However, the portfolio moves less than 
the market (the coefficient for Mkt_RF < 1) and this result is statistically significant at a 0.1% 
level.  
Further, when we employ the Fama and French five-factor model to estimate portfolio-risk 
adjusted returns and risk exposures, we observe that family firms display a high exposure to 
size risk (SMB). Specifically, we note that the family firm portfolio would gain 0.43% if the 
SMB portfolio were to gain 1%. This is to be expected for two reasons: Family firms tend to be 
small as shown in the descriptive statistics where the mean firm has a market capitalization of 
1.3 billion and a median at 780 million euro in market capitulation. These levels are to be 
considered small as various investment professionals define a small firm as less than 5 billion 
euro (Ludvigsen, 2019), less than 2.5 billion euro (Klerk, Kersley, Bhatti, & Vair, 2018), and 
less than 2 billion euro (S&P Global, 2020). Consequently, our sample consists of many small 
firms. Further, as an equal-weighted portfolio gives more weight to smaller firms, it is to be 
expected that our portfolio has high exposure to size risk.  
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Table 5: Performance of the equal-weighted portfolio (1) and the value-weighted 
portfolio (2). 
Our results are stationary and robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. To check for autocorrelation, we perform the Breusch-Godfrey 
test, and to check for heteroskedasticity we performed the Breusch-Pagan test. We use robust standard errors to confront the issues of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
One could expect that the CMA factor, which is a proxy for whether firms invest conservatively 
or aggressively, to be significant in either direction. On the one hand, family firms are often 
said to be conservative both with respect to debt levels and investment activity (Klerk, Kersley, 
Bhatti, & Vair, 2018). On the other hand, as we are dealing with small-cap firms that assumingly 
are expected to grow and take market share, one would assume that they need to invest in an 
aggressive way to accomplish such features. Neither relationship shows in the results. Different 
firms may load differently on the CMA factor and hence the results are offset. 
Any results from an equal-weighted portfolio consisting of small caps and large caps can be 
questioned due to the difficulty to replicate the portfolio and the return in real life. An equal-
weighted portfolio takes for granted that one can increase/decrease the weighting in the small 
caps without any issue. It may be difficult to perform transactions in small caps with low 
liquidity and even if one were able to do transactions in an illiquid stock, one would most likely 
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affect the price. Additionally, since the Fama and French portfolios are value-weighted, one 
can also run a value-weighted portfolio in the model.  
6.2 Performance of the Nordic value-weighted portfolio 
Regression (2) in Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates for the Nordic value-weighted family 
portfolio. We notice that the intercept again is positive and shows an abnormal return for family 
firms, with an average monthly alpha of 2.19%. This result is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Contrary to the equal-weighted portfolio, however, the value-weighted portfolio is not 
statistically significant with respect to how the market moves (Mkt_RF), but only to how the 
size factor (SMB) fluctuates. This is rather interesting as one expects that independently of 
whether the family firms are equal- or value-weighted that they would be somewhat correlated 
with the general market. This result is therefore surprising.  
The portfolio is negatively exposed to the size factor, meaning that the portfolio tilts towards 
larger family firms. This is to be expected in a value-weighted portfolio as it consistently 
rebalances the portfolio with respect to market capitalization for the family firms in the sample.  
If large firms, which gets a higher weight in a value-weighted portfolio than smaller firms, 
perform well, the value-weighted portfolio will outperform an equal-weighted portfolio, even 
if the smaller firms outperform the larger firms. This is a mathematical consequence of a value-
weighted portfolio. Since our value-weighted portfolio does indeed outperform the equal-
weighted portfolio by 1.15 percentage points, this suggests that our portfolio does consist of 
high performing large-cap firms.  
To check for this, we investigate which firms in the value-weighted portfolio that has a large 
weighting based on market capitalization. We find that ten firms account for 59% of our 
portfolio in terms of market capitalization as of 31.12.2019 and that our three largest firms 
Novo Nordisk (Denmark), Atlas Copco (Sweden), and Kone (Finland) account for 21%, 7%, 
and 6%, respectively. We then create a value-weighted portfolio of these ten large well-
performing firms and run a regression to see if the abnormal return is similar or not to the Nordic 
value-weighted portfolio. The results are shown in Table 6 regression (1). We observe that the 
average monthly alpha of this portfolio is 2.09 % and is similar to the 2.19% of the Nordic 
value-weighted portfolio. This suggests that these firms account for a large portion of the 
Nordic value-weighted portfolio’s return. Lastly, the two portfolios have approximately the 
same weight in the size factor (SMB). 
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Table 6 shows the coefficients estimates of three regressions: A portfolio of the ten largest firms 
(1), the Nordic value-weighted portfolio without Novo Nordisk (2), and a regression of only 
Novo Nordisk (3). These will be discussed in numerical order. 
Table 6: Performance of the ten largest firms (1), full portfolio without Novo Nordisk 
(2), and Novo Nordisk alone (3). 
 
Our results are stationary and robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. To check for autocorrelation, we performed the Breusch-Godfrey 
test, and to check for heteroskedasticity we performed the Breusch-Pagan test. We use robust standard errors to confront the issues of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
As a side note, considering transaction cost, an investor might have been better off investing in 
the ten large firms rather than investing in the full Nordic value-weighted portfolio. Note though 
that this argument is highly sensitive to ex-post performance and is not an indicator of future 
returns. 
Why has Novo Nordisk been wrongly priced 
To further investigate our results, we exclude Novo Nordisk from the Nordic value-weighted 
portfolio. This is due to Novo Nordisk accounting for 21% of the full Nordic value-weighted 
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portfolio discussed above, which is three times more than the second-largest firm. 
Consequently, the firm has the potential to skew the data and the outcome of the analysis. 
To assess how much Novo Nordisk’s performance impacted our Nordic value-weighted 
portfolio we performed a regression (regression (2) in Table 6) without Novo Nordisk. The 
results were quite surprising as the alpha fell to 0.81% from 2.19%, meaning that our Nordic 
value-weighted portfolio is highly sensitive to Novo Nordisk. To validate this, we created a 
portfolio with Novo Nordisk alone and observed that the monthly average return was 1.68% 
and significant at a 0.1% level. This confirms our finding in regression (2). Indeed, the Nordic 
value-weighted portfolio is highly driven by Novo Nordisk’s performance. We will in the 
following explain how any potential mispricing could have happened for such a long time.  
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) got widely accepted by academia after Eugene Fama’s 
influential survey article “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work” 
(Fama, 1970). The general view was that “securities markets were extremely efficient in 
reflecting information…(and) when information arises, the news spreads very quickly and is 
incorporated into the prices of securities without delay” (Malkiel B. G., 2003, p. 59). To further 
understand EMH, one should define the term efficiency. Here, we use the definition that an 
efficient financial market is one that does not allow investors to earn an above-average return 
without accepting above-average risks (Malkiel B. G., 2003).    
To understand how Novo Nordisk could have been mispriced for such a long time, we first 
must look at the arguments regarding short-term momentum and underreaction to new 
information. Lo and MacKinlay (1999) find that there seems to be some momentum in the short 
run and that there are too many successive movements in the same rejection. According to 
behavioral economists, this is due to the “bandwagon effect” which states that individuals see 
a stock price rising and are drawn into the market (Malkiel B. G., 2003). While there might be 
possible to earn an excess return by following a momentum strategy, once you include 
transaction costs, several studies, such as Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004), show that such 
strategies fail to be profitable anyhow.  
Moreover, there is substantial research that shows that, in the long run, the market reverts to the 
mean. This is because when a firm can earn an above-average return on capital, the competitors 
will observe this and want a piece of the pie. This causes increased competition and the 
deterioration of economic profit. Consequently, there is a mean-reversion to earning above-
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average returns. (Poterba & Summers, 1988). As a result, it should be highly difficult for Novo 
Nordisk to operate with an above-average return over two decades. 
Interestingly, Malkiel (2003) finds that the mean reversion is weaker in some periods than 
others. This could imply that our time period is indeed one where this is the case, and could 
explain why the market did not manage to efficiently price Novo Nordisk. Yet, this is not an 
indication that it should continue in the future. This argument could be true as the time period 
includes both the internet bubble of the early 2000s and the financial crisis. However, it seems 
rather weak, as while stock prices might at times be irregularly priced, the market is quick to 
efficiently price securities.  
One explanation for Novo Nordisk’s extensive outperformance is that family firms, in general, 
tend to trade at a discount as high family ownership gives minority shareholders less ability to 
control corporate governance such as active investments and dividend policies. Minority 
investors are also more exposed to the risk of expropriation by controlling block-holders (Cella, 
2009). The controlling owner of Novo Nordisk has over time held close to 75% of its voting 
shares. This could suggest that investors might have discounted Novo Nordisk throughout the 
whole time period to compensate for the risk of possible expropriation by the dominant owner 
and a conservative corporate governance policy.  
However, we argue that the main reason for Novo Nordisk’s outperformance, as a world-
leading provider of diabetes-care products with a market share of more than 50%, is that the 
forecasts were too conservative at the beginning of 2000 and 2005. In the article “Global 
Prevalence of Diabetes: Estimates for the year 2000 and 2030”, researchers tried to forecast the 
prevalence of diabetes and the number of people of all ages with diabetes for the year 2000 and 
2030 (Wild, Green, Sicree, & King, 2004). They found that the prevalence of diabetes for all 
age-groups worldwide was to reach 4.4% within 2030 and rise from 171 million in 2000 to 366 
million in 2030. Shaw, Sicree, and Zimmet (2010) wrote another article in 2010 where they 
estimated that by 2010, diabetes prevalence for all age-groups worldwide would have grown to 
6.4% or 285 million, and 7.7% or 439 million by 2030.  
When we look at the actual numbers, we note that obesity and diabetes have become far more 
common than initially anticipated. Already by 2019, the prevalence of diabetes reached 9.3% 
or 463 million which is 10 years ahead of the previous forecasts and is now expected to reach 
10.2 % or 578 million by 2030 (Saeedi, Petersohn, Salpea, Bright, & Williams, 2019).  
 35 
In retrospect, we know now that the diabetes forecasts were too low at the beginning of 2000 
and these estimates have gradually been increased year by year as the actual numbers have been 
above the pre-estimations. Consequently, we argue that investors likely priced Novo Nordisk 
correctly with respect to the available information regarding diabetes, but the continuous 
increase in diabetes forecasts worldwide also lead to an incrementally improved trajectory for 
Novo Nordisk as a firm. This was something investors could not price ex-ante and thus, this 
has to be the source of the continued mispricing which we have observed in our data. 
6.3 Country- and year-specific results 
We are also interested in whether there are any differences in results among the Nordic 
countries. To investigate this, we create four portfolios, one for each country, only including 
family firms from the respective country. Even if the four countries of concern have mainly 
similar characteristics to their firm population, there are also some differences in characteristics 
that may be pivotal with regards to the return of the firms. Some country-specific characteristics 
that may influence performance are that Norway is heavily oil-dependent while Finland and 
Sweden have a more differentiated industrial focus, and Denmark has more pharmaceutical 
companies.   
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Table 7: Country-specific results 
Our results are stationary and robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. To check for autocorrelation, we performed the Breusch-Godfrey 
test, and to check for heteroskedasticity we performed the Breusch-Pagan test. We use robust standard errors to confront the issues of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
The results of the four countries’ value-weighted portfolios are reported in Table 7. We find 
that Denmark has the overall highest monthly abnormal return, compared to the other countries, 
with an alpha of 2.28%. Finland and Sweden follow with both having an alpha of 1.27%. 
Norway has achieved an alpha of 0.87% but the coefficient is not significant at a 5% level. This 
suggests that the Norwegian family firm portfolio has not generated higher returns than being 
passively invested in the five factors of Fama and French during our sample period. The return 
of the Norwegian family firm portfolio seems to be explained by exposure to market risk and 
low book-to-market firms. The results in Table 7 are particularly interesting, showing us that 
most of the Nordic family firm portfolio’s overperformance compared to the five factors is due 
to family firms in Denmark, as this portfolio achieves an even higher alpha than the whole 
region. Moreover, these results also support the discussion about Novo Nordisk’s importance 
in the Nordic family firm portfolio as Novo Nordisk is a substantial part of the Danish portfolio. 
Furthermore, we examine whether there have been any differences in when the Nordic family 
firm portfolio achieved its alpha. To do this we split our portfolio into four five-year periods, 
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2000-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014, and 2015-2019. Interestingly, there are no significant 
results in the first and last five-year period. That is, the overperformance of family firms was 
obtained in the period 2005-2015. Between the years 2010-2014 the family firm portfolio 
achieved an astonishing alpha of 3.69%, making up most of the portfolio’s abnormal return in 
our 20-year time period.  
We note that the price of Novo Nordisk has more or less been flat during the last five years of 
our sample period and, considering how important Novo Nordisk is in our portfolio, this may 
be the reason why our portfolio does not show any significant alpha in the last period. This 
suggests that the pricing of Novo Nordisk was more correct during the last five-year period and 
that the number of diabetes cases was more aligned with the forecast. Furthermore, in the same 
period, the family firm portfolio excluding Novo Nordisk does not show any significant alpha 
as well, giving more magnitude to the fact that family firms generally did not create an abnormal 
return during the last 5 years. 
6.4 Robustness tests 
Empirical model uncertainty is something that cannot be avoided in analytical science, and 
there are several reasons why measurement uncertainty occurs. Human error is one of these 
causes, and bias towards input variables can cause a researcher to alter the outcome of an 
empirical study without purposely doing so. In this paper, one source of human bias could be 
that even though our findings show that family firms generate higher returns than passively 
investing in the five factors, this performance may not necessarily be a consequence of being a 
family firm but rather stem from a country’s market performance.  
To account for this country-specific performance, we download the total return for the “All 
Index” for each country (e.g., Copenhagen All Index), representing most of the firms publicly 
listed in the respective countries. These indexes are value-weighted and consist of both family 
and non-family firms. As we do with our family firm portfolio, we regress the four different 
indexes against the Fama and French five-factor model. The results are presented in Table 8. 
Any significance concerning the intercept will indicate that the market, in general, has created 
an abnormal return for the last 20 years compared to passively being invested in the five factors. 
Moreover, this will mean that the general performance of the market in one or more of the 
Nordic countries at least partially accounted for the family firm’s performance and one could 
not fully suggest that family firms indeed are better at generating higher returns.  
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Table 8: Regressions of the Nordic Indexes 
 
 
Our results are stationary and robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. To check for autocorrelation, we performed the Breusch-Godfrey 
test, and to check for heteroskedasticity we performed the Breusch-Pagan test. We use robust standard errors to confront the issues of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
However, our findings indicate that none of the Nordic indexes had an abnormal return with 
respect to the Fama and French five-factor model at a significance level of five percent. This 
suggests that there is something else than the general performance of the Nordic markets that 
explains the abnormal return of the family firm portfolio. Consequently, this supports that it is 
the family firms themselves that are the reason behind the family firm portfolio’s 
outperformance, that causes this abnormal return. This finding is consistent with research done 
by Anderson and Reeb (2003) which shows a positive relationship between public family firms 
and family ownership in the US. One could argue that the same relationship applies to Nordic 
countries as well.  
Note that the t-value for the Danish market is close to the acceptance limit of 1.96, suggesting 
that the Danish family firm portfolio’s alpha could potentially be somewhat explained by the 
Danish market performance. Yet, the intercept is not significant at a 5% level and thus the null 
hypothesis that the intercept is equal to zero is not rejected. 
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7. Limitation of research  
In this section, we discuss relevant limitations to our study. More specifically, we discuss the 
problems involving survivorship bias, endogeneity, and the sensitivity of our results to the 
family definition. 
7.1 Survivorship bias 
A caveat with our sample is that we fail to include firms that stop being a family firm during 
our sample period. That is, all family firms that for various reasons cease being a family firm 
by 2020 are eliminated from the sample. Firms may disappear because of closure, reduction of 
shares leading to less than 20% ownership, or that the firm has been delisted. We have chosen 
2019 as our base year with regard to ownership. In other words, we have looked at the firms’ 
ownership situation at the end of 2019 and selected the firms that meet our definition of a family 
firm. As a consequence, our family portfolio consists only of firms that have survived since 
being listed until today, which may cause a positive bias to our results. This is a bias that a 
normal stock index would not suffer from as such an index would include firms going in and 
out of the index. 
To avoid such survivorship bias, we would have to screen family ownership for each year in 
the sample period and allow firms to enter and exit the portfolio. This would, however, take 
more time than is possible for a master thesis since the ownership data is collected manually. 
There might not be any clear answer to what would have been the best solution regarding the 
choice of the base year, but the main takeaway is to be aware of the potential positive 
survivorship bias in our results.  
7.2 Endogeneity 
One important limitation which our research might suffer from is the endogeneity problem. 
Endogeneity means that the regressor is correlated with the error term (Wooldridge, 2009), and 
endogeneity leads to the causality problem which is “does X cause Y or does Y cause X”. In 
our analysis, the question is whether family ownership improves performance, or if strong 
performance causes families to hold on to their ownership. As family firms, commonly defined 
as run by a founder or close relative to the founder, often have good information about the 
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firm’s future trajectory, one could logically assume that founders will only hold on to the 
ownership if the prospects look bright and promising. Alternatively, one could expect family 
firms with a negative trajectory to decrease their ownership as they are exposed to this decrease 
in wealth creation, and this leads to a sample with only those businesses with positive outlooks. 
However, Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that while it could be logical for family firms to 
decrease their holdings if the firms perform unsatisfyingly, it will require tremendous foresight 
for family firms to do this in advance as they on average hold their stakes for 75.9 years. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) go further and argue that this implies that family firms have better 
information than institutional investors. It also suggests that they are better at estimating the 
future path of their own businesses than institutional and professional investors. This is 
contradictory as the efficient market hypothesis suggests that prices should incorporate all 
available information.  
In sum, it is plausible that our regressor indeed is correlated with the error term, and that our 
findings cannot conclude that an investor would be better off holding a portfolio of family firms 
than passively owning the whole market. 
7.3 Family firm definition issue 
We want to elaborate on section 2.1 and section 3 about family firm definitions and how this 
can impact our results. As we saw in section 2.1, there are several ways to define a family firm 
and these definitions can lead to various outcomes. As an example, Amit and Villalonga (2006) 
who researched the relationship between family firms and performance found that the result 
was insignificant, positive, or negative, all depending on how they defined family firms. This 
illustrates the coherent problem when researching family firms. However, we use a stricter 
definition than applied by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Amit and Villalonga (2006), as they 
do not require an ownership threshold to define a family firm, while we use 20%.  
On the other hand, Berzins and Bøhren (2013) argue that the ownership threshold should be at 
least 50%, but they look at private firms where there are more incidents of ownership-levels 
above 50%. Looking at public firms, our threshold of 20% ownership gives us a larger data 
sample to examine.  
To check whether only including those firms where the family owns 50% or more would change 
our results, we made a value-weighted portfolio only consisting of such firms. We use the same 
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definition as described in section 2.1.2 except changing the ownership threshold from 20% to 
50%. Strengthening our main findings, this portfolio does not show any different result, 
achieving a monthly alpha of 2.24%. Since we get the same positive results with firms having 
a family majority owner, it leads to the same finding that family firms have generated higher 
returns in the last 20 years. Interestingly, removing Novo Nordisk from this portfolio also has 
an impact. The monthly alpha drops from 2.24% to 0.92% and is only statistically significant 
at a 10%-level. This implies that the performance of Novo Nordisk heavily influences this 
portfolio’s performance too. These results suggest that we can continue with the same 
conclusion drawn from the portfolio with an ownership threshold at 20%. We emphasize the 
uncertainty family firm definitions may bring upon the results of family firm studies.   
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8. Conclusion 
This study examined the effect family ownership have on stock market firm performance in 
2000 - 2019. We define a family firm as a firm where the founder, or individuals related to the 
founder either by blood or marriage, has at least 20% ownership. Active participation by the 
family is not necessary, but rather a right. Furthermore, we have used a linear regression of the 
Fama and French five-factor model to test whether a portfolio of Nordic family firms has 
generated higher returns than being passively invested in the five factors over the last 20 years. 
Overall, the results show that the value-weighted Nordic family firm portfolio has generated an 
average monthly abnormal return of 2.19%. This result is statistically significant. It suggests 
that, during the last 20 years, an investor would have been better off investing in Nordic family 
firms than the five factors of Fama and French. Moreover, this is in line with prior research on 
public family firms in the U.S. (Amit & Villalonga, 2006; Anderson & Reeb, 2003), and several 
European countries (Cella, 2009). We have ruled out the possibility of general market 
overperformance in the Nordic countries as a reason why our family firm portfolio shows such 
great performance, which suggests that there may indeed be a family effect on these firms. 
Moreover, our equal-weighted portfolio also suggests that our family firm portfolio creates a 
monthly abnormal return, as it generated an average monthly abnormal return of 1.04%. 
However, it might be difficult to replicate such a portfolio due to liquidity issues. 
We further investigate the economic rationale as to why our Nordic family firm portfolio has 
performed so well and find that our value-weighted portfolio is highly affected by the 
performance of the ten largest companies, which account for 59% of our portfolio's market 
capitalization. There is specifically one company, namely Novo Nordisk – the danish diabetes 
market leader, that does extraordinary well. Due to its substantial market capitalization, the firm 
dominates both the Danish portfolio but also the Nordic value-weighted portfolio and has a 
severe influence on how our portfolio performs. Thus, our findings are also economically 
significant.  
We note that our portfolio might suffer from a survivorship bias and an endogeneity problem. 
This may cause a positive bias to our results, meaning that our portfolio shows better 
performance than what might be the actual case. As such, we encourage further research by 
either using different definitions of family firms than what has been applied in this thesis or by 
controlling for specific industry effects. 
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